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Abstract
We formulate Bohmian mechanics (BM) such that the main objects of concern
are macroscopic phenomena, while microscopic particle trajectories only play an
auxiliary role. Such a formulation makes it easy to understand why BM always
makes the same measurable predictions as standard quantum mechanics (QM), ir-
respectively of the details of microscopic trajectories. Relativistic quantum field
theory (QFT) is interpreted as an effective long-distance theory that at smaller dis-
tances must be replaced by some more fundamental theory. Analogy with condensed-
matter physics suggests that this more fundamental theory could have a form of non-
relativistic QM, offering a simple generic resolution of an apparent conflict between
BM and relativistic QFT.
Keywords: Bohmian mechanics; relativistic QFT; effective theories; condensed matter
physics
1 Introduction
Quantum interpretations (see e.g. [1, 2] for short reviews and [3] for a review of their
experimental status) are frameworks for thinking about conceptual questions that cannot
be answered by the standard quantum formalism. One of the interpretations is Bohmian
mechanics (BM) [4, 5, 6, 7], which is usually (but not always [8]) presented as a theory
the main point of which is to offer a fundamental microscopic ontology - trajectories of
elementary particles. For many physicists, especially instrumentalists, such a point of
departure may not look intuitive and well motivated, the consequence of which is that
BM is widely ignored or misunderstood in a wider physics community. Besides, BM is
best understood as an interpretation of non-relativistic QM, while its generalization to
relativistic quantum field theory (QFT) is still an unsolved problem. Various approaches
to the Bohmian interpretation of relativistic QFT have been proposed (see e.g. [6, 9,
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10, 11, 12, 13] and references therein), but neither of those approaches seems completely
satisfying.
In this paper we offer a new instrumentalist-friendly formulation of BM in which the
main objects of concern are macroscopic phenomena, especially readings of the measuring
instruments, while microscopic ontology only plays a secondary auxiliary role. With such
a reformulation it is much easier to understand intuitively why BM always makes the
same measurable predictions as standard quantum mechanics (QM), irrespectively of the
details of microscopic ontology. Furthermore, from the point of view that all currently
well established physical theories are merely effective theories [14, 15, 16] describing only
the phenomena at sufficiently large distances, it seems plausible to assume that relativistic
quantum field theory (QFT) must be replaced by a completely different theory at smaller
distances. By extending the ideas introduced in [17], we use the analogy with condensed-
matter physics to suggest that this more fundamental theory could have a form of non-
relativistic QM, which offers a simple generic resolution of an apparent conflict between
BM and relativistic QFT.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 we present some philosophical preliminar-
ies. In particular, we introduce and explain the concept of a perceptible – a macroscopic
phenomenon amenable to a direct human perception – which is the central concept in our
instrumental formulation of physics. In Sec. 3 we formulate QM in terms of perceptibles,
emphasizing the origin of an instrumental version of the Born rule. In Sec. 4 we introduce
Bohmian mechanics as a natural completion of the formulation of QM in terms of percep-
tibles. In Sec. 5 we discuss how BM can naturally be made compatible with relativistic
QFT by arguing that relativistic QFT is not a fundamental theory. Finally, in Sec. 6 we
present a brief summary of our results.
2 Philosophical preliminaries
2.1 Four basic notions in philosophy of physics
Let us start with definitions of four basic concepts in philosophy of physics that we shall
use in the rest of the paper.
Ontology: Things which are supposed to be there irrespective of (human) observations.
Determinism: The property that the future is completely determined by the past.
Here “determined” can have two different meanings, namely (i) determined in principle
or (ii) determined in practice, e.g. by human-made computers with restricted compu-
tational power. A prominent example is deterministic chaos, which is deterministic in
principle but not in practice. In the rest of the paper, unless explicitly stated otherwise,
by “determined” we mean determined in principle. If determinism in that sense is right,
the fundamental laws of physics are not probabilistic.
Instrumentalism: The stance that the main goal of physics is to predict and control
the macroscopic phenomena, especially the outcomes of scientific instruments. In that
sense, most physicists are (at least partly) instrumentalists.
Instrumental interpretation of QM: According to this interpretation, QM only pre-
scribes probabilities of measurement outcomes. Hence this interpretation is not deter-
ministic in the practical sense. However, it usually says nothing about determinism in
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principle or about ontology, as long as it does not help to predict the macroscopic phe-
nomena. For instance, it usually does not offer answers to questions such as “Does particle
have a position before one measures it?”.
2.2 The trouble with Bohmian mechanics
Bohmian mechanics (BM) postulates that quantum particles are pointlike objects with
deterministic trajectories. This postulate is usually motivated by the goal of prescribing
a fundamental microscopic ontology. Namely, according to BM, a particle has a position
even if one does not measure it. Contrary to a widespread misconception, determinism is
not the main goal of BM. The determinism of BM is only a byproduct.
Typical instrumentalists, however, do not care about ontology. Instrumentalists often
say that ontology is not physics, but metaphysics. Hence instrumentalists usually do not
find BM intuitive and well motivated. The consequence is that BM is widely ignored or
misunderstood in a wider physics community.
The main goal of this paper is to reformulate BM such that it looks better motivated
and more intuitive to a wider physics community, especially instrumentalists.
2.3 Three funny “ble” nouns in QM
In the rest of the paper it will be crucial to understand the difference between three words,
the first of which is well known in QM, the second of which is less known, and the third
of which is completely new in QM. Here we give brief explanations of their meaning.
Observable: In QM it is a noun (while in normal English it is an adjective). An ob-
servable is a hermitian operator in the Hilbert space. It is related to a quantity that can
be measured in an actual experiment, but it is not identical to a quantity that can be
measured in an actual experiment. An operator in the Hilbert space is only a mathemat-
ical tool that theorists use to describe the nature, no experimentalist has ever seen an
operator in the nature itself. As beautifully expressed by the instrumentalist Asher Peres
[18], “Quantum phenomena do not occur in a Hilbert space, they occur in a laboratory.”.
Beable: That word was coined by John Bell [9]. It means the same as ontology: stuff
which is there irrespective of observation. The concept of a beable is central to Bohmians,
but not to instrumentalists.
With a goal to make BM more meaningful to instrumentalists, we find useful to in-
troduce one additional concept, which we call perceptible.
Perceptible: In physics it is a noun (while in normal English it is an adjective). It
is a thing or phenomenon amenable to direct human perception. Some examples of per-
ceptibles are tables, chairs, the Moon, macroscopic instrument, click in the detector, the
macroscopic picture of an atom produced by electron microscope, etc. Some examples of
non-perceptibles are wave function, electron, photon, atom, etc.
2.4 More on perceptibles and beables
Since perceptible is a new concept that will be essential for understanding the rest of the
paper, here we provide some additional explanations of that concept. In addition, we
explain how the concept of beable can be interpreted from an instrumental point of view.
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perceptible explained by non-perceptible
click in the photon detector photon
picture of atom produced by electron microscope atom, electrons
falling apple gravitational field
music from the radio radio wave
Table 1: Examples of perceptibles and the corresponding non-perceptibles that explain
the perceptibles.
The distinction between perceptibles and non-perceptibles is similar to the distinction
between macroscopic and microscopic. In particular, all microscopic entities are non-
perceptibles. However, a macroscopic entity does not necessarily need to be a perceptible.
For example, gravitational field and radio wave are macroscopic but not perceptibles.
Non-perceptibles are theoretical constructs that help to explain and predict the proper-
ties of perceptibles. Some examples are given in Table 1. In general, to make a measurable
prediction means to predict a property of a perceptible.
We said that a non-perceptible is a theoretical construct. However, when we say that
it is a theoretical construct, we do not say that it is not a beable. In fact, a beable is
a theoretical construct itself; the claim that something is a beable really means that it
is a beable in a given theory. For instance, point-like particles are beables in classical
mechanics, but not in classical field theory such as classical electrodynamics with contin-
uous charge distributions. Hence, by saying that something is a beable, in this paper we
do not necessarily claim that it exists in the reality. A beable may exist according to a
theory, but the theory does not need to be identical with the reality (the map is not the
territory, as the proverb says). Nevertheless, to intuitively understand a given theory, it
may be useful to imagine that its beables exist in the reality, because that sometimes helps
to think about the theory. Hence we adopt an instrumental interpretation of a beable,
according to which it is just a useful thinking tool.
We also emphasize that, like with macroscopic and microscopic, there is no strict
border between perceptible and non-perceptible. For instance, is a one-cell microorganism
macroscopic or microscopic? There is no unambiguous answer to that question. Similarly,
is perception of a one-cell microorganism by optical microscope direct or indirect? It must
be direct to be called a perceptible, but there is no unambiguous border between direct
and indirect perception. A perception by a naked eye is clearly direct, a perception by
an electron microscope is clearly indirect, but a perception by an optical microscope is
somewhere in between. Nevertheless, even though there is no strict border between micro
and macro, or between perceptibles and non-perceptibles, the concepts are useful.
By contrast, the property of being a beable is a binary property. An object is either a
beable or not, it cannot be somewhere in between. One object can be more macroscopic
than another, but one object cannot be more a beable than another.
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3 Quantum theory of perceptibles
3.1 All perceptibles can be reduced to macroscopic positions
As we said, all perceptibles are macroscopic. This means that they are large in the
position space. Hence, when two perceptibles can be distinguished, it means that they
can be distinguished by macroscopic positions of something.
The simplest example is the measurement of spin. The spin is an observable, but it
is not a perceptible. As discussed in many QM textbooks, spin can be measured by the
Stern-Gerlach apparatus. In this case, the perceptible is a big dark spot on the screen of
the apparatus.
Similar can be said about other, usually more sophisticated instruments, which are
either digital or analog. For analog instruments, the perceptible is a position of a macro
pointer. For digital instruments, the perceptibles are positions of the lines that make a
digit on the screen.
How about a click in the detector? The sound is determined by macroscopic oscillations
of something, e.g. of a membrane of the speaker. This oscillation is nothing but a
macroscopic position as a function of time. Hence a click in the detector can also be
reduced to macroscopic positions.
What about senses such as color, taste or smell? They are created in the eye, tongue
or nose respectively (and interpreted by brain), by stimulation of a nerve. For the creation
of a sense it is not so much important what stimulates the nerve (what kind of light or
chemical). It is much more important which nerve is stimulated. For instance, the electro-
stimulation of the sweet nerve creates the illusion of sweetness, without having any sweet
chemical. Since different nerves have different macroscopic positions, it means that even
senses such as color, taste and smell can be reduced to macroscopic positions.
3.2 The origin of Born rule in QM
The Born rule is usually presented as a postulate that, in any Hilbert-state basis {|k〉},
the probability is given by
pk = |〈k|ψ〉|
2. (1)
However, it is not really necessary to postulate it in all possible bases. It is sufficient to
postulate it only in the position basis, because the instrumental form of the general Born
rule (1) can be derived from the Born rule in the position space.
To derive the instrumental form of the general Born rule (1), we start from the crucial
insight that what we need are probabilities of perceptibles, such as the probability that
a detector will click. The results of Sec. 3.1 then imply that probabilities of percepti-
bles must be computed in the position space. However, since there is no strict border
between perceptible and non-perceptible, it seems natural to compute all probabilities in
the position space. In this way, the position basis becomes a preferred basis not only for
macroscopic degrees of freedom, but even for the microscopic ones.
To understand it in more detail, suppose that we measure a microscopic observable Kˆ
with eigenstates |k〉. For simplicity, we assume that Kˆ has a non-degenerate spectrum (in
Sec. 3.3 we shall discuss more general measurements). The microscopic observable can be
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written in the spectral form
Kˆ =
∑
k
k|k〉〈k|. (2)
To describe the measurement, we also need to describe the macroscopic apparatus, that is
the perceptible. The macroscopic apparatus can be described by its microscopic quantum
state |A〉. If the initial state of the measured system is |k〉 and if the initial microscopic
state of the apparatus is |A0〉, then the interaction between the measured system and the
apparatus induces a unitary transition of the form
|k〉|A0〉 → |k
′〉|Ak〉. (3)
Here we allow that |k′〉 may be different from |k〉, which means that we consider measure-
ments slightly more general than projective measurements. (In Sec. 3.3 we shall discuss
even more general measurements.) We require that different measurement outcomes are
macroscopically distinguishable, for otherwise the interaction cannot be interpreted as
a measurement. Hence the apparatus wave functions have a negligible overlap in the
multi-position space, i.e.
Ak1(~x)Ak2(~x) ≃ 0 for k1 6= k2. (4)
Here Ak(~x) ≡ 〈~x|Ak〉, where
~x ≡ (x1, . . . ,xn), (5)
n is the number of particles constituting the apparatus, and the wave functions are nor-
malized as ∫
d~x |Ak(~x)|
2 = 1, (6)
with d~x ≡ d3nx.
Similarly, if the initial state of the measured system is in a superposition
|ψ〉 =
∑
k
ck|k〉, (7)
where
ck = 〈k|ψ〉, (8)
then (3) generalizes to
|ψ〉|A0〉 →
∑
k
ck|k
′〉|Ak〉. (9)
A more realistic analysis includes also the environment, so (9) further generalizes to
|ψ〉|A0〉|E0〉 →
∑
k
ck|k
′〉|Ak〉|Ek〉 ≡ |Ψ〉. (10)
Hence the state after the measurement can be written in the final form
|Ψ〉 =
∑
k
ck|Ak〉|Rk〉, (11)
where the apparatus state |Ak〉 describes the perceptible and |Rk〉 = |k
′〉|Ek〉 describes all
the rest. This state can be written in the multi-position representation as
Ψ(~x, ~y) =
∑
k
ckAk(~x)Rk(~y), (12)
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where ~y are positions of all particles except those of the apparatus. Hence the Born rule
in the multi-position space
ρ(~x, ~y) = |Ψ(~x, ~y)|2 (13)
gives the probability density
ρ(~x, ~y) ≃
∑
k
|ck|
2|Ak(~x)|
2|Rk(~y)|
2, (14)
where (4) has been used. Therefore the probability density for positions of the apparatus
particles is given by the marginal probability density
ρ(appar)(~x) =
∫
d~y ρ(~x, ~y) ≃
∑
k
|ck|
2|Ak(~x)|
2. (15)
Now let the support of Ak(~x) be the region of ~x-space in which Ak(~x) is not negligible.
Then the probability to find the apparatus particles in the support of Ak(~x) is
p
(appar)
k =
∫
supp Ak
d~x ρ(appar)(~x) ≃ |ck|
2. (16)
Recalling (8), we see that (16) coincides with the Born rule (1) in arbitrary k-space, which
finishes the derivation of the general Born rule (1) from the Born rule (13) in the position
space.
3.3 Generalized measurements
To emphasize the importance of Eq. (11), we refer to it as the master formula of quantum
measurement and write it in a slightly more general form
|Ψ〉 =
∑
l
c˜l|Al〉|Rl〉. (17)
In the master formula (17) (not to be confused with the master equation in the the-
ory of quantum decoherence [19]), |Al〉 denotes the microscopic state of the perceptible,
|Rl〉 represents the microscopic state of all the rest, and c˜l are some coefficients obeying∑
l |c˜l|
2 = 1. Eq. (17) is a generalization of (11) in the sense that the coefficients c˜l do
not need to be equal to ck given by (8). In general, the coefficients c˜l depend not only on
the initial state (7) of the measured system, but also on details of its interaction with the
apparatus and the environment.
In the derivation of the master formula (11) in Sec. 3.2, the label k had a double
meaning:
(i) Eigenstates |k〉 of an observable Kˆ with a non-degenerate spectrum.
(ii) Label of distinct perceptibles.
For more general measurements, however, the label l in (17) does not need to have
the meaning (i). Examples where the meaning (i) cannot be applied include measure-
ment of an observable with a degenerate spectrum, measurement of the photon position,
measurement of time, etc. Nevertheless, all such generalized (not necessarily projective)
7
measurements can be described by the POVM formalism [18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25] and
the Neumark’s theorem [18] provides that any POVM measurement can be reduced to
a projective measurement in some larger Hilbert space. Physically, this means that the
master formula (17) with the meaning of l given by (ii) is valid for any measurement with
clearly distinguishable outcomes. Identifying the larger Hilbert space with the product
HA ⊗ HR of the apparatus Hilbert space HA and the Hilbert space HR of the rest, the
relevant projectors in the larger Hilbert space are |Al〉〈Al| ⊗ 1. So even if there is no
microscopic observable (2), one can always interpret the measurement as a projective
measurement of the apparatus observable
Lˆ(appar) =
∑
l
l|Al〉〈Al|. (18)
Hence, by repeating the analysis described by Eqs. (12)-(16), we conclude that the in-
strumental form of the Born rule
p
(appar)
l ≃ |c˜l|
2 (19)
is always true, whenever the probability density in the multi-position space is given by
ρ(~x, ~y; t) = |Ψ(~x, ~y, t)|2.
4 Bohmian mechanics
4.1 Motivation for BM
In contrast with more traditional approaches to BM, in our instrumental approach to BM
we do not start from postulating particle trajectories. Instead, our main postulate is this:
Axiom 1 All perceptibles are beables.
Loosely speaking, it says that the Moon is there even if nobody observes it. The opposite
would be that the Moon is only in our mind, which few physicists would find appealing.
Hence the Axiom 1 is motivated by common sense, but we stress that it is impossible to
prove or disprove this axiom by the scientific method. This axiom is nothing but a useful
thinking tool. It is useful because it is mentally hard (though not impossible [26]) to think
the opposite in a logically consistent manner. As we shall see, most of the motivation for
BM arises from this common sense axiom.
Before discussing how that leads to BM, let us note that the famous Bell theorem [9]
can be expressed in the language of perceptibles as follows: If perceptibles described by
QM are beables, then those perceptibles obey non-local laws. That is, if the correlated,
yet spatially separated, quantum measurement outcomes are there even before a single
local observer detects the correlation, then the measurement outcomes are governed by
non-local laws [27, 28]. Note that the Bell theorem expressed in that form avoids the
notion of “hidden variables” and does not depend on the assumption of determinism.
As we explained, a perceptible is determined by the microscopic positions ~x = (x1, . . . ,xn)
of the apparatus particles. In principle one might conceive that the microscopic positions
are not beables, even though the macroscopic position of the perceptible is a beable. How-
ever, as we explained in Sec. 2.4, something can be less macroscopic than something else,
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but it cannot be less a beable than something else. Hence, to conceive that only macro-
scopic positions are beables, one would need to introduce a strict border between micro
and macro positions, which would look ad hoc and conceptually complicated. Therefore,
to avoid such complications, we propose that all ~x are beables, which is the simplest
possibility compatible with the Axiom 1. Similarly, as there is no strict border between
perceptibles and non-perceptibles, we propose that positions ~y of all the rest are beables
too.
In Sec. 3 we have derived the quantum mechanical Born rule in arbitrary k-space from
the Born rule in the position space. This means that any theory, for which the probability
density in position space is
ρ(~x, ~y; t) = |Ψ(~x, ~y, t)|2, (20)
has the same measurable predictions as QM.
This is valid even for generalized measurements discussed in Sec. 3.3. As an example,
consider measurement of time. It is well known that there is no time operator Kˆ = Tˆ
with eigenstates |k〉 = |t〉 [29, 30]. Nevertheless it is not a problem for measurement of
time, because in the master formula (17) written as
|Ψ〉 =
∑
l
c˜l|Cl〉|Rl〉, (21)
the label l just labels the distinct macroscopic positions of the macroscopic clock pointer
with microscopic clock states |Cl〉.
So far, in this section we have found motivation for two requirements. The first
requirement is that perceptibles are beables, which was motivated by common sense. The
second requirement is that ρ(~x, ~y; t) = |Ψ(~x, ~y, t)|2, which was motivated by QM. What
kind of theory can satisfy both requirements?
A simple theory that satisfies both requirements is a theory in which all positions
~q = (~x, ~y) are beables and random. This looks almost like standard QM, except that
standard QM does not insist that ~q are beables. However, such a theory in which the
positions ~q are random does not explain the Born rule for ~q. In this theory, the Born rule
for ~q is still postulated.
Can we do better? Can we explain the Born rule for ~q? The requirement that ~q is a be-
able implies that it has a value ~Q(t) at each time t. In principle ~Q(t) could be a stochastic
(that is, non-deterministic) function of time t. However, ~Q(t) must be compatible with
ρ(~q; t) = |Ψ(~q, t)|2, and the Schro¨dinger equation implies that |Ψ(~q, t)|2 is a deterministic
function of t. This suggests (but not proves) that ~Q(t) could be deterministic too.
To summarize, the requirement that perceptibles are beables suggests that ~Q(t) exists,
while the requirement of compatibility with the Schro¨dinger equation suggests that ~Q(t)
is deterministic. This is the motivation for introducing BM.
4.2 Construction of BM
How can a deterministic law for ~Q(t) be compatible with the probability density ρ(~q; t) =
|Ψ(~q, t)|2? The compatibility condition is that ~Q(t) is determined by a law of the form
d ~Q(t)
dt
= ~v( ~Q(t), t), (22)
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where ~v(~q, t) is a function that satisfies the continuity equation
∂|Ψ|2
∂t
+ ~∇(|Ψ|2~v) = 0. (23)
Namely, if ρ(~q; t0) = |Ψ(~q, t0)|
2 for initial t0, then the continuity equation implies that
ρ(~q; t) = |Ψ(~q, t)|2 for all t.
In fact, the continuity equation is analogous [6, 7] to the Liouville equation in clas-
sical statistical mechanics. This means that the probability density ρ(~q; t) = |Ψ(~q, t)|2
corresponds to a quantum equilibrium, which can be explained even without assuming the
initial condition ρ(~q; t0) = |Ψ(~q, t0)|
2. Similarly to classical statistical mechanics [31, 32],
there are two different approaches to the explanation of quantum equilibrium from the
continuity equation. One approach is based on a H-theorem [33] and the other approach
is based on typicality [34]. For a review of both approaches see [35].
So is there such ~v = (v1, . . . ,vN), with N being the number of particles, that satisfies
the continuity equation (23)? In non-relativistic QM the answer is yes, because it is well
known that the Schro¨dinger equation itself
HˆΨ = ih¯∂tΨ (24)
with
Hˆ =
N∑
a=1
pˆ2a
2ma
+ V (~q) (25)
implies a continuity equation of the form (23) with
va =
−ih¯
2ma
Ψ∗
↔
∇aΨ
Ψ∗Ψ
=
Re(Ψ∗vˆaΨ)
Ψ∗Ψ
, (26)
where vˆa = pˆa/ma is the velocity operator and pˆa = −ih¯∇a is the momentum operator.
The quantity |Ψ|2 ≡ Ψ∗Ψ is the probability density for particles without spin. Simi-
larly, (26) also describes particles without spin. To generalize those expressions to particles
with spin, all one has to do is to make the replacement
Ψ∗ · · ·Ψ→ Ψ† · · ·Ψ =
∑
α
Ψ∗α · · ·Ψα, (27)
where
∑
α represents the sum over all spin indices.
The results above show that BM works for non-relativistic QM. But we stress that
the law (22) with (26) is non-local when the wave function is in the entangled state. The
velocity of any particle at time t depends on the positions of all particles at the same time
t, no matter how far the other particles are. We also stress that this non-local interaction is
the only interaction between Bohmian point-like particles. When the wave function is not
entangled, then Bohmian point-like particles do not interact with each other at all. In this
sense, Bohmian particles have only non-local interactions. However, one should distinguish
this interaction between Bohmian point-like particles from the interaction described by
the Hamiltonian in the Schro¨dinger equation. The latter describes the evolution of the
wave function, which should be distinguished from the evolution of Bohmian particle
positions. Hence the fact that Bohmian particles have only non-local interactions is not
in contradiction with the possibility of having a Hamiltonian with local interactions.
4.3 Robustness of long distance physics
In physics, there is a general rule of thumb that says that the laws of long distance physics
do not depend on details of small distance physics. There are many examples of that rule.
For instance, fluid mechanics and thermodynamics do not depend on details of atomic
physics. (One does not need to know much about atomic physics to be an expert in fluid
mechanics or thermodynamics.) Similarly, atomic physics does not depend on details of
nuclear physics. Likewise, nuclear physics does not depend on details of quarks. And
finally quantum chromodynamics, the standard theory of quarks and gluons, does not
depend on details (or even validity) of string theory.
This intuitive rule can be formalized more generally by the Wilson renormalization
theory (see e.g. [36]). According to the Wilson renormalization theory, the long distance
physics is obtained from more fundamental microscopic theory by integrating out the small
distance degrees of freedom.
This general rule helps to understand why BM has the same measurable predictions
as standard QM, which we discuss in more detail in the next subsection.
4.4 Robustness of measurable predictions by BM
Similarly to the general rule in physics discussed in Sec. 4.3, the perceptibles in BM do
not depend on details of particle trajectories. This is seen from Eqs. (15) and (16), which
say that probability of a perceptible is obtained by integrating out over all microscopic
positions
p
(appar)
l =
∫
supp Al
d~x
∫
d~y |Ψ(~x, ~y)|2. (28)
Intuitively, it says that the precise particle positions are not very much important to make
measurable predictions. It is important that particles have some positions (for otherwise
it is not clear how can a perceptible exist), but it is much less important what exactly
those positions are. That is why BM (with trajectories) makes the same measurable
predictions as standard QM (without trajectories).
It is extremely important not to overlook the general idea above that the precise par-
ticle positions are not essential (unless some special conditions are met, which we discuss
at the end of this section). For otherwise, one can easily make a false “measurable predic-
tion” out of BM that seems to differ from standard QM, when in reality there is no such
measurable prediction. The general recipe for making such a false “measurable predic-
tion” out of BM is to put too much emphasis on trajectories and ignore the perceptibles.
A lot of wrong “disproofs of BM” of that kind are published in the literature.
By a peer pressure of making new measurable predictions out of BM, even distin-
guished Bohmians sometimes fall into this trap. For instance, some try to make new
measurable predictions of arrival times by computing the arrival times of microscopic BM
trajectories (see e.g. [37, 38]). However, the microscopic trajectories are not perceptibles,
so the arrival times obtained from microscopic BM trajectories may be rather deceptive
from a measurable point of view. To make a measurable prediction, one must first specify
how exactly the arrival time is measured [39], which requires a formulation of the prob-
lem in terms of a perceptible. When the problem is formulated in that way, BM makes
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the same measurable predictions as standard QM, despite the fact that there is no time
operator in standard QM (recall also the discussion around Eq. (21)).
Another example of Bohmian computations that may look deceptive from a measurable
point of view are computations of the gravitational field g(Bohm)µν (x, t) in Bohmian quantum
cosmology (see e.g. [40] and references therein). Even though the gravitational field is
macroscopic, we recall from Sec. 2.4 that it is not a perceptible. Moreover, g(Bohm)µν (x, t)
is not a classical gravitational field, so analysis of a measurable effect should involve
some version of the quantum master formula (17). As long as computations in Bohmian
quantum cosmology do not discuss consequences of (17), it is not clear what, if anything,
is the meaning of g(Bohm)µν (x, t) from a phenomenological point of view.
BM is deterministic, so why cannot it make deterministic predictions of measurement
outcomes? It is because of the quantum equilibrium [33, 34], which is most easily un-
derstood through the analogy with thermal equilibrium. In the full thermal equilibrium,
macroscopic changes can only happen due to rare statistical fluctuations. In principle,
those fluctuations are in classical statistical physics governed by deterministic laws. Nev-
ertheless, owing to a large number of particles, those deterministic laws cannot be used
to make deterministic predictions in practice. In practice, thermodynamics makes deter-
ministic predictions of macroscopic changes only when the full system is not in a thermal
equilibrium.
In addition, we stress that one does not need to explain why a system is in the equi-
librium, for equilibrium is the most probable state. It is rather the absence of equilibrium
that needs an explanation. For instance, it is still not clear why the Universe is not in a
thermal equilibrium. On the other hand, the fact that the Born rule is consistent with all
existing experiments is evidence that the Universe is in the quantum equilibrium.
Why cannot BM trajectories be observed? Or more precisely, why cannot a single
measurement reveal a Bohmian particle position with a precision better than the spatial
width of the wave function? This is not only because Bohmian positions are not percepti-
bles; after all atom positions are also not percetibles, yet electron microscope can be used
to observe atom positions. The true reason why Bohmian positions cannot be observed
with a precision better than the spatial width of the wave function is because there are
no local interactions (in the sense explained in Sec. 4.2) between BM particles. To make
an analogy, trying to observe a Bohmian trajectory is like trying to observe the Moon’s
trajectory by watching tides. Classical gravity is a long range force, so the observation of
effect on B caused by A does not directly reveal the position of A. That is why we cannot
observe the Moon’s trajectory by watching tides.
Finally let us note that, even though the quantum equilibrium is a natural hypoth-
esis consistent with observations, it is not a logical necessity. Deviations from quantum
equilibrium are in principle possible, in which case the precise Bohmian particle positions
may be important and Bohmian mechanics may lead to measurable predictions that differ
from standard QM, as proposed e.g. in [41, 42]. The proposal in [42] has been ruled out
experimentally in [43].
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5 Beyond relativistic QFT
5.1 What particles is BM about?
So far we were talking about particle trajectories, but we did not specify what kind of
particles we are talking about. Is it atoms? Or is it smaller particles such as protons
and neutrons? Or is it more fundamental particles like electrons, quarks, photons and
Higgs? Or perhaps quasiparticles (collective excitations), like phonons? As we stressed
several times, the predictions on perceptibles do not depend much on those details. Yet
the details are important for their own sake.
Take for example a phonon. The phonon trajectory is certainly not a beable because
we know that one phonon is a collective motion of many atoms. Photons and electrons, on
the other hand, are usually viewed as fundamental particles, rather than quasiparticles.
But do we actually know that photon or electron is not a collective excitation of some
more fundamental degrees of freedom? We stress that we do not know that.
Let us explain. Theories which serve as good approximations at longer distances,
but not at smaller distances, are called effective theories [16]. The theory of phonons
is certainly an effective theory. There is some theoretical evidence that the Standard
Model of “elementary particles” is an effective theory too [15, 16]. One evidence is the
fact that the Standard Model has a lot of parameters (masses, coupling constants and
mixing angles) which are extracted from experiments but cannot be explained by the
Standard Model itself, suggesting that there is an unknown more fundamental theory
that should explain them. Another evidence is the fact that the Standard Model is a
continuous quantum field theory (QFT) with “ultraviolet” short-distance divergences, the
consequence of which is that it cannot be formulated in a mathematically rigorous way,
which suggests that there should be a more fundamental theory that does not suffer from
such mathematical problems. Yet another evidence is the fact that the Standard Model
does not contain quantum gravity, which is a strong indication that the Standard Model is
incomplete. It is not known what the fundamental theory behind the Standard Model is,
but one viable possibility is that the “elementary particles” like electrons, quarks, photons,
etc. are in fact collective excitations. Collective excitations of what? Of some truly
elementary particles. What those truly elementary particles are? We do not know, because
we still do not have the theory of everything. We can only say that this hypothetic truly
elementary particles are for photons (and other Standard Model “elementary particles”)
what the atoms are for phonons.
How is that relevant to BM? The point is that Bohmian particle trajectories can only
be beables for the truly elementary particles, whatever those truly elementary particles
are. (For an illustration of that idea see also Sec. 5.4.) Hence it seems very likely that BM
trajectories are not beables for the Standard Model “elementary particles” like electrons,
quarks, photons and Higgs.
5.2 Bypassing relativistic QFT
In Sec. 4.2 we found an explicit construction of BM for non-relativistic QM. But what
about relativistic QFT?
The “elementary particles” such as electrons, photons etc. are described by relativistic
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QFT. But in Sec. 5.1 we argued that we do not need BM trajectories for them. The BM
trajectories are only needed for truly elementary particles. We do not know yet what the
theory of those truly elementary particles is, but in principle it is possible that the truly
elementary particles are not described by relativistic QFT. In fact, there is a good heuristic
argument for that. For truly fundamental particles it makes sense to assume that they
cannot be created and destroyed. On the other hand, it is known that relativistic QM and
QFT naturally lead to particle creation and destruction (see e.g. [44, 45]). Hence it seems
reasonable to assume that the truly fundamental particles, if they exist, are described by
non-relativistic QM. If so, then BM bypasses relativistic QFT.
This can also be interpreted as a generic measurable prediction of BM. The simplest
formulation of BM, described in Sec. 4.2, requires that the most fundamental degrees are
described by non-relativistic QM. This means that the simplest version of BM predicts
that at some very small distances (not yet amenable to our current experimental technolo-
gies such as those in Large Hadron Collider at CERN) we should find new particles the
observable properties of which do not obey Lorentz invariance. This generic prediction
differs e.g. from generic predictions of string theory [46].
5.3 How could it be that non-relativistic QM is fundamental
and that relativistic QFT is only an approximation?
It is usually considered that relativistic QFT is fundamental, while non-relativistic QM is
only an approximation. By contrast, we propose that the opposite is the case. How could
that be? The basic idea is presented in most textbooks on condensed-matter physics.
First, to avoid terminological confusion, let us say that by “relativistic” we mean a
property of any theory (fundamental or not) that it is invariant under Lorentz transfor-
mations with some constant speed parameter c˜. Explicitly, for a boost in the x-direction,
those Lorentz transformations are
x′ =
x− vt√
1− v2/c˜2
, y′ = y, z′ = z, t′ =
t− vx/c˜2√
1− v2/c˜2
. (29)
The usual notion of relativistic theory is a special case, in which the speed parameter is
fixed to be the speed of light c˜ = c.
Now consider sound. Sound waves satisfy the wave equation
1
c2s
∂2ψ
∂t2
−∇2ψ = 0. (30)
This equation is Lorentz invariant under Lorentz transformations in which the speed
parameter is the speed of sound c˜ = cs. Eq. (30) is a valid approximation only at distances
much larger than interatomic distances, so the Lorentz invariance is an approximation
valid only at those large distances. The sound wave is propagated through the medium
made of atoms, which means that the Lorentz invariant wave equation is derived from
non-relativistic motion of atoms. The medium can be thought of as the “ether” for sound
waves. If one observed only the sound and nothing else, it would look as if there was no
“ether” for sound and the Lorentz invariance of (30) would look like a fundamental law.
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In reality, we also observe phenomena other than sound, which is how we know that the
Lorentz invariance of (30) is not fundamental.
The classical wave equation (30) can be “quantized”, which leads to a quantum theory
of sound (see e.g. [47]). First quantization of ψ leads to QM of a single phonon. Second
quantization of ψ leads to QFT of phonons. Those are standard tools in condensed-matter
physics. They are derived from non-relativistic QM of atoms, where each atom is thought
of as an object made of a pointlike nucleus surrounded by electrons. In this way, the
creation and destruction of relativistic phonons is derived from a non-relativistic theory
of a fixed number of atoms.
By analogy [17], it is conceivable that all relativistic “elementary particles” of the
Standard Model (photons, electrons, etc, which are relativistic with c˜ = c) can be derived,
in a similar way, from some hypothetic more fundamental non-relativistic particles. If so,
then the world looks “fundamentally” relativistic only because we do not yet see those
more fundamental degrees.
Such a theory can be thought of as a neo-Lorentzian ether theory. (For other theories
of that kind in modern literature see e.g. [48, 49, 50].) The 19th century Lorentzian ether
theory [51] was ruled out by the famous Michelson-Morley experiment, which ruled out
the possibility that the Earth moves through the ether. What we propose here is that
the Earth (and everything else) is made of ether. No experiment so far ruled out that
possibility, so such a neo-Lorentzian ether theory is a viable possibility.
In the literature there are many explicit models in which various qualitative properties
of the Standard Model of “elementary particles” are derived from condensed-matter sys-
tems. For explicit models of that kind we refer readers to the books [52, 53] and references
therein. A model that could reproduce all quantitative details of the Standard Model is
still not known, but the broadness and flexibility of the condensed-matter framework is
a reason for optimism. In that sense, the condensed-matter framework in a search for a
more fundamental theory is similar to string theory, as string theory is also a broad and
flexible framework within which a model that could reproduce all quantitative details of
the Standard Model has not yet been found [54].
5.4 Example: A Phonon and its Bohmian interpretation
Let us illustrate the general qualitative ideas above by an example. Consider a crystal
lattice made of N atoms with positions
~q = (q1, . . . ,qN). (31)
The wave function Ψ(~q, t) satisfies the non-relativistic Schro¨dinger equation (24)-(25),
where V (~q) describes the inter-atomic interactions. Let Ψp(~q, t) be the solution corre-
sponding to one acoustic phonon with momentum p. Then the most general 1-phonon
solution is
Ψ(~q, t) =
∑
p
cpΨp(~q, t). (32)
In the abstract Hilbert space this state can be written as
|Ψ(t)〉 =
∑
p
cp|Ψp(t)〉, (33)
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which can also be represented by a 1-quasiparticle wave function
ψ(x, t) =
∑
p
cpe
−i[ω(p)t−p·x]. (34)
Here ω(p) = cs|p| is the Lorentz invariant dispersion relation for acoustic phonons and
we use units h¯ = 1. The 1-quasiparticle wave function ψ(x, t) satisfies wave equation
1
c2s
∂2ψ
∂t2
−∇2ψ = 0. (35)
Now we want to understand how this system can be understood from a Bohmian point
of view. To illustrate the general idea that microscopic details of BM depend on what is
considered fundamental, we consider four different versions of Bohmian interpretation.
Bohmian interpretation 1: The existence of the phonon wave function ψ(x, t) suggests
that one can introduce a phonon Bohmian trajectory X(t). It makes sense if one imagines
that phonon is a fundamental particle. Few physicists would take such a picture seriously.
Bohmian interpretation 2: Now consider a somewhat more serious version of BM. This
version denies the existence of the phonon trajectory X(t), but the wave function Ψ(~q, t)
of N atoms suggests that atoms have Bohmian trajectories ~Q(t). It makes sense if one
imagines that atoms are fundamental. Within this interpretation one can identify three
different wave-like objects:
• The 1-phonon wave function ψ(x, t), which is relativistic and not fundamental.
• The multi-atom wave function Ψ(~q, t), which is non-relativistic and fundamental.
• The collective motion of atoms ~Q(t), which is non-relativistic and fundamental.
Bohmian interpretation 3: An even more serious version of BM denies the existence of
atom trajectories ~Q(t), because the atoms are not fundamental, but made of “elementary
particles” such as quarks and electrons. Hence this version of BM accepts the existence
of quark and electron Bohmian trajectories ~Qquarks & electrons(t). It makes sense if one
imagines that quarks and electrons are fundamental. However, it requires a relativistic
version of BM compatible with QFT, which is not easy to construct (for an attempt see
e.g. [12, 13]).
Bohmian interpretation 4: This version of BM denies the existence of quark and elec-
tron trajectories ~Qquarks & electrons(t), but accepts the existence of as yet unknown truly
fundamental particles with Bohmian trajectories ~Qtruly fundamental(t). The truly fundamen-
tal particles cannot be created and destroyed, so they are described by non-relativistic
QM. This bypasses the hard problem of relativistic BM in the Bohmian interpretation
3. The Bohmian interpretation 4 is the version of BM that we actually propose in this
paper.
6 Summary
In this paper we introduced the notion of perceptibles, which are macroscopic entities
that we observe directly. Since perceptibles are macroscopic, they are distinguished in
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the position space. The non-perceptibles such as wave function, atom, photon, etc. are
theoretical constructs that explain the perceptibles. Our main axiom for the perceptibles
is that all perceptibles are beables. Essentially, it means that the Moon is there even
when we do not observe it. However, there is no strict border between perceptibles and
non-perceptibles, which suggests that microscopic positions are beables too. This is the
motivation for introducing Bohmian mechanics (BM), according to which particles have
trajectories.
But what particles? BM only makes sense if the particle trajectories are trajectories
of the fundamental particles. On the other hand, as discussed is Sec. 5.1, there are
indications that the Standard Model particles might not be fundamental, suggesting that
BM should not be applied to them. Moreover, the simplest version of BM makes a generic
measurable prediction; it predicts that the fundamental particles obey non-relativistic
QM. Analogy with phonons indicates that fundamental non-relativistic QM may lead to
non-fundamental relativistic QFT, which, in principle, bypasses the problem of relativistic
BM without knowing the details of those hypothetic fundamental particles.
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